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Abstract
We study optimal income taxation in a framework where one's willingness to report
his income truthfully is positively correlated with his type. We show that allowing low-
productivity types to cheat leads to Pareto-superior outcomes as compared to deterring
them, even if audits can be performed costlessly. When there is no cheating, redistribution
takes place on first- and second-best frontiers and can never make low-ability types more well-
off than high-ability types. Letting low-ability types cheat allows first-best redistribution up
to a limit at which low-ability types are better off than high-ability types.
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1 Introduction
It is nearly five decades since Mirrlees (1971) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972) launched the
literatures on the optimal general income tax and on the tax evasion. These have now grown
into two of the most fertile subdisciplines in the of economics of taxation area. Notwithstanding
the fact that they both are mostly concerned with efficient and fair ways to raise tax revenues
for the government, they have gone their separate ways. The optimal tax literature has mainly
focused on the formulation of income tax schedules; the tax evasion literature on the design of
enforcement policies taking the tax schedule as given. This is no doubt due to their opposite
foundational assumption. Whereas the Mirrleesian optimal taxation literature assumes incomes
are publicly observable, the tax evasion literature has unobservability of incomes as its raison
d'être.
Over this period of time, the attempts to bring these two literatures together have been
few and far between. One, published some twenty five ago is Cremer and Gahvari (1995) who,
using the Stiglitz (1982) two-group reformulation of Mirrlees (1971), allow for incomes to be
misreported and observed only through costly audits. They investigate the properties of the
resulting optimal policy that consists of a general income tax schedule, an audit policy that is
conditioned on reported incomes, and punishment for misreporters.1
The aim of this paper is to shed light on a hitherto ignored role that tax evasion might play in
the design of an optimal general income tax schedule. We ask if the widely-accepted proposition
that tax evasion is a bad thing (welfare reducing) and has to be deterred, when not too costly,
is always correct. Are there circumstances under which tax evasion can be a good thing which
should be glossed over even if it can be deterred at a low costindeed costlessly? This is a
question that has not been asked previouslyat least to the best of our knowledge.
We consider this question within the two-group reformulation of Mirrlees (1971) optimal
income tax problem by Stiglitz (1982)a setting we shall refer to as MS (for Mirrlees/Stiglitz).
We adopt its informational structure about the public unobservability of ability types and labor
supplies, but not observability of incomes. Specifically, assume that the two groups differ in
their willingness to reveal their true incomes. At the most general level, the two heterogeneity
sources of types and truthful income-reporting can be uncorrelated or correlated either positively
or negatively. Andreoni et al. (2017) have recently argued that, contrary to popular perceptions,
the rich are more likely to behave socially than the poor.2 Interestingly, a positive correlation
1Other attempts include Sandmo (1981) and Cremer and Gahvari (1994) who restrict the income tax schedule
to be linear. Schroyen (1997) too allows for non-linear taxation but restricts the penalty to be proportional to
the tax evaded.
2Andreoni et al. (2017) attribute this behavior to the diminishing marginal utility of income. We should point
out, however, that the aim of this paper is not to take side on Andreoni et al.'s findingonly to explore its
implication for devising optimal general income tax policies in the presence of tax evasion.
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between the two characteristics of productivity and honesty have surprising implications for
devising optimal general income tax policies in the presence of tax evasion. The paper aims to
explore these implications. We shall refer to the setting where high-wage individuals reveal their
income truthfully as EL (for evasion by the low-wage type).
That the simultaneous existence of honest in addition to dishonest taxpayers matter for
equilibrium outcomes and policy design have long been recognized in the literature but not within
the Mirrleesian optimal tax paradigm. Gordon (1987) introduces a psychic cost of evasion into
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and study how that changes the latter paper's results. Erard
and Feinstein (1994) posit a game theoretic framework to study and compare the equilibrium
solutions for a model with dishonest taxpayers and a model with a mix of honest and dishonest
taxpayers. Honesty is defined in terms of truthful reporting of incomes which are exogenously
determined. The tax system is given with constant proportional tax and penalty rates. The
policy design is limited to audits based on reported incomes.
Alger and Renault (2006) study the importance of honesty in a wider context. They consider a
principle and agent framework wherein the agent has certain private information. The agent may
or may not feel compelled to reveal his private information truthfully. If he does, he is referred
to as honest; otherwise as dishonest. The authors introduce another layer of complication to
this setup by assuming that an honest agent may or may not feel compelled to reveal that he is
honest. They show that the distinction matters significantly and that this latter conditional
honesty drastically affects the set of implementable allocations.
In our setup, honesty refers only to truthful reporting of incomes; taxpayer's type always
remains hidden. Incomes are endogenous and the policy design includes the tax system whose
sole restriction is incentive compatibility (with respect to type). The tax administration is able
to uncover true incomes through an auditing policy conditioned on reported incomes.
All individuals, regardless of their type, choose their labor supply and the amount of income
they want to report. Low-wage individuals' true income does not have to be related to their
reported income, however. Their tradeoff between labor supply and consumption is not affected
by the tax schedule. This is not the case for high-wage individuals. With their reported income
being the same as their true income, their labor supply depends on the tax schedule. And if they
want to choose the same consumption/reported-income bundle as low-wage individuals (mimic
them as the terminology goes), high-wage individuals will have to work less hours than low-wage
individuals in order to actually earn what the latter types report.
We show that allocations that can be implemented in the EL setting include the set of im-
plementable allocations under MS. The inclusion is strict; there are first-best allocations that
cannot be implemented in the MS setting with full observability of incomes, but are imple-
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mentable under EL when low-productivity individuals' incomes are not observable. Interestingly
too, auditing is never optimal in this setting. This is surprising a priori because one would
expect less information to yield a worse outcome. The intuition for the result is that, if the
income of low-productivity individuals is not observable, the tax schedule does not affect their
labor supply choice which can then be set at its first-best level. Hence their reported income can
be distorted down, to relax the incentive constraints of high-productivity individuals, but at no
welfare loss. Put differently, one can decrease the utility of the mimicker without hurting the
mimicked individual. We derive conditions under which the no-audit solution implements the
first best.
The paper's other results include the finding that any utility level that a low-wage individual
can attain under a second-best MS solution, is available to him as a first-best EL solution.
Moreover, first-best EL solutions include the Rawlsian outcome as well as outcomes wherein
low-wages individuals are better off than high-wage individuals (neither of these type of solutions
are available under MS).
2 The benchmark model (MS)
Consider an economy with two types of individuals, denoted by i = h, `, who differ in their
productivity wh and w` with wh > w`. There are nh persons of type h and n` persons of type `.
Preferences over consumption x and labor supply L are represented by the utility function
u(x, L),
satisfying the standard properties. Denote pre-tax incomes by Ii = wiLi, tax payments by
Ti and assume purely redistributive taxes. The full information Pareto-frontier is obtained by
maximizing a weighted sum of utilities with weights such that αh+α` = 1 subject to the resource
constraint. It is determined by solving problem PF defined as
max
Th,Ih,T`,I`
W = αhu
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+ α`u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
,
s.t. nhTh + n`T` = 0.
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The first-best (FB) allocations, denoted by [(T ∗h , I
∗
h), (T
∗
` , I
∗
` )],
3 satisfy the FOCs (see Stiglitz,
1982):
αhuc
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
= nhµ, (1a)
uc
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
+
1
wh
uL
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
= 0, (1b)
α`uc
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
w`
)
= n`µ, (1c)
uc
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
w`
)
+
1
w`
uL
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
w`
)
= 0, (1d)
where µ > 0 denotes the multiplier associated with the resource constraint. These conditions,
along with the resource constraint determine the Pareto frontier PF represented in Figure 1,
where uh and u` denote the utility of h- and `-type individuals.
u`
uh
b
a
cMS
PF
0
45o
Figure 1: Pareto frontier and implementable allocations under MS and EL.
By the first theorem of welfare economics, the competitive equilibrium is on PF ; it is shown
by point a which is above the 45 degree line because wh > w`. In what follows, we concentrate
on the part of the frontier which is to the right of the competitive equilibrium. This implicitly
assumes that the weights are such that the solution involves redistribution from the high-wage
to the low-wage individuals so that T ∗h > T
∗
` . We know from Stiglitz (1982) that this includes
the utilitarian FB obtained when αi = ni. We also assume I
∗
` > 0.
The Mirrlees-Stiglitz problem assumes that incomes Ii = wiLi are publicly observable at
no cost but wi and Li are not (for i = h, `). One then has to add an incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) to problem PF , which yields problem PMS defined as
3We shall refer to [(T ∗` , I
∗
` ), (T
∗
h , I
∗
h)] as an allocation even though, strictly speaking, it corresponds to the
allocation [(x∗` , I
∗
` ), (x
∗
h, I
∗
h)] = [(I
∗
` − T ∗` , I∗` ), (I∗h − T ∗h , I∗h)].
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max
Th,Ih,T`,I`
W = αhu
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+ α`u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
s.t. u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
− u
(
I` − T`, I`
wh
)
≥ 0, (2)
nhTh + n`T` = 0.
It is the common practice to refer to the utility of the h-type evaluated at the allocation intended
for the l-type in the incentive constraint as the utility of a fictitious mimickera terminology
that we also follow. Stiglitz (1982) has shown that problem PMS can have two types of solution.
In one, the incentive compatibility constraint in (2) is non-binding and the solution is on the
Pareto frontier (PF). This is depicted by that part of PF in Figure 1 which ends at point b. In
the other, the solution is given by the FOC of problem PMS along with the binding incentive
compatibility constraint in (2) and the resource constraint. This is depicted by the MS curve in
Figure 1 that starts from point b.
3 The model with low-productivity type evaders (EL)
Consider the MS setting with the same information structure about the public unobservability
of ability types and labor supplies. Change the assumption of observability of all incomes to that
of observability of high-productivity type incomes only. Specifically, assume that the two groups
differ in their willingness to reveal their true incomes. The high-wage persons, who cannot be
identified by the government, willingly reveal their true income Ih = whLh. On the other hand,
the low-productivity persons, who are not identifiable either, do not feel obligated to report their
income I` = w`L` truthfully. Their income can only be observed through audits. Denoting
reported income by I˜, we thus have I˜h = Ih but I˜` may differ from I`. Assume 0 ≤ I˜` ≤ I`
to rule out negative- and over-reporting of income.4 Concentrate again on the case where the
binding incentive constraint (if any), is from the h-type to the `-type. Assuming no audits are
performed (we show below that is in fact the optimal policy), the policy problem is
max
Th,Ih,T`,I˜`
W = αhu
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+ α`u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
s.t. u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
− u
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)
≥ 0, (3)
I˜` ≥ 0,
n`T` + nhTh = 0,
4The no-overreporting constraint simplifies the expressions; one can easily show that it will not be binding.
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and referred to as P`.
Observe that, while the policy designer does not set I` directly, it is effectively set indirectly.
Low-wage persons are induced to choose and report I˜` and T`. They then, given these values,
choose I` to maximize u (I` − T`, I`/w`). Importantly, u (I` − T`, I`/w`) is the only term in
problem (3) that depends on I`.
5 Consequently, the optimal choice of I` by low-wage individuals
is tantamount to maximization of W with respect to I`. This allow us to reformulate problem
P` by including I` in the list of decision variables. This is represented by problem P ′`, which is
the same as P` except that there is an extra decision variable.
The Kuhn-Tucker expression for problem P ′` is
£ = αhu
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+ α`u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
+
λ
[
u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
− u
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)]
+ γI˜` + µ (nhTh + n`T`) .
Observe that P ′` is similar to PMS except that I˜` replaces I` in the utility of the mimicker; see
(2) and (3). Importantly, though, problem P ′` contains an extra choice variable in comparison
with PMS . This variable is I˜` and can always be set equal to I` to obtain the MS alloca-
tion. The idea we develop below is the possibility of choosing I˜` such that u
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
<
u (I` − T`, I`/wh). If this is possible, reducing u
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
relaxes the otherwise binding
incentive constraint and allows for increased redistribution to enhance welfare.
The first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are
∂£
∂Th
= − (λ+ αh)uc
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+ µnh = 0, (4a)
∂£
∂Ih
= (λ+ αh)
[
uc
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+
1
wh
uL
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)]
= 0, (4b)
∂£
∂T`
= −α`uc
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
+ λuc
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)
+ µn` = 0, (4c)
∂£
∂I˜`
= −λ
[
uc
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)
+
1
wh
uL
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)]
+ γ = 0, (4d)
∂£
∂I`
= α`
[
uc
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
+
1
w`
uL
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)]
= 0, (4e)
λ
∂£
∂λ
= −λ
[
u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
− u
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`
wh
)]
= 0, (4f)
γ
∂£
∂γ
= γI˜` = 0. (4g)
It is clear that µ > 0 in the above expressions because the resource constraint must be binding.
However, it is possible that the other multipliers may be zero and we only have λ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0.
5Unobservability of I` disconnects it from the incentive compatibility constraint.
7
Consequently, Problem P ′` may yield different solution regimes depending on the pattern of the
binding and non-binding constraints. To study this issue in the most efficient way, we organize
our analyses around the results that are already known for the MS problem and examine if or
how they may change.
4 EL: Solution regimes
As with the MS setting, we distinguish between first- and second-best regimes.
4.1 First best
The solutions under EL will be first best if λ = γ = 0 in problem P ′`. The notable point about
them is that they include all first-best allocations that are implementable under MS. First,
we know from Stiglitz (1982) that, because the competitive equilibrium satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraint with strict inequality, the Pareto efficient allocations in the neighborhood
of this equilibrium can be implemented under the MS information structure. Intuitively, the IC
constraint is not violated when the amount of redistribution is small. Denote the first-best
value of a variable by a star on top of it. They satisfy the IC constraint
u
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
≥ u
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
wh
)
, (5)
and are represented diagrammatically by the segment ab on the Pareto frontier in Figure 1. To
see that these allocation are also implementable under EL, one can simply duplicate them by
setting [(Th, Ih), (T`, I˜`)] = [(T
∗
h , I
∗
h), (T
∗
` , I
∗
` )]. Although low-wage individuals can now cheat
without fearing of audits, they will not do so because I` = I
∗
` maximizes their utility regardless
of their report (as long as T` = T
∗
` ).
The more interesting question is whether there are first-best allocations that can be imple-
mented under EL but not under MS. Consider a Pareto efficient allocation [(T ∗h , I
∗
h), (T
∗
` , I
∗
` )] for
which (5) does not hold and thus is not implementable under MS. Then formulate an EL policy
that consists of the tax function
T (I˜) = I∗` − c∗` = T ∗` if I˜ = 0, (6)
= I∗h − c∗h = T ∗h if I˜ > 0, (7)
and no audits. The `-types' best option is to report I˜ = 0 and pay T ∗` which then leads them
to earn I∗` . To report I˜ > 0 and pay T
∗
h > T
∗
` will only reduce their utility. As to the h-types,
recall that they cannot misreport their income. Consequently, if they were to report I˜ = 0 in
order to receive −T ∗` , they must also earn Ih = 0. Their options are thus either (i) pay T ∗h and
earn I∗h or (ii) receive and consume −T ∗` and earn Ih = 0.
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The first-best solution will be implementable under EL if and only if
u
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
≥ u (−T ∗` , 0) . (8)
Now, as long as I∗` > 0, the right-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint (5) is larger
than that of (8):
u
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
wh
)
> u
(
I∗` − T ∗` ,
I∗`
w`
)
> u
(
0− T ∗` ,
0
w`
)
.
Condition (8) is thus strictly weaker than (5). Consequently, there must exist FB allocations
that can be implemented under EL even though they are not attainable under MS. These are
the allocations that satisfy (8) but not (5). They are represented by segment bc on the Pareto
frontier in Figure 1.
Observe also that while (8) must hold for some Pareto efficient allocations, it will not hold
for all. As long as u (−T ∗` , 0) > 0, there will be a non-empty segment below and to the right
of point b which is implementable under EL. However, when the first-best utility of high-wage
individuals gets sufficiently close to zero, the direction of this inequality will unavoidably be
reversed. Consequently, there must exist a non-empty subset of the Pareto frontier that cannot
be implemented through EL. This is illustrated in the numerical example given in Section 5
below.
Finally, we have thus far assumed that no audits are performed. This is in fact the optimal
policy because audits can only do harm. With a positive probability of audits, low-wage indi-
viduals might find it optimal to report I˜` > 0. Which will then mean that they have to pay T
∗
h
rather than T ∗` making the implementation of [(T
∗
h , I
∗
h), (T
∗
` , I
∗
` )] no longer feasible. Moreover,
when I˜` > 0, incentive constraint (8) would have to be amended thus making the mimicking
option more attractive for the h-type. This in turn will reduce the set of FB allocations that can
be implemented.
The results derived thus far are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the EL and MS settings as defined in the paper. (i) The set of first-best
allocations that can be implemented under EL includes the set of allocations that is implementable
in the MS setting. (ii) As long as I∗` > 0, the inclusion is strict so that there exist FB alloca-
tions that can be implemented under EL but not under MS. (iii) Not all FB allocations are
implementable under EL. (iv) Auditing is never desirable.
That the unobservability of I` leads to the implementability of first-best allocations, unattain-
able when I` is observable at no cost, is a rather striking result. Having less information is ex-
pected to bring about a worse outcome, not a better one. To garner intuition for this, remember
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that in the MS setting, distorting the low-wage individuals' labor supply downwards is needed to
make mimicking more costly to the high-wage individuals. The distortion is no longer needed for
this purpose, nor is it possible to induce it, under EL. The incentive constraint is manipulated
through I˜` in a way that makes mimicking even more costly than under MS. Low-wage individ-
uals report I˜` and choose their most desired level of labor supply which would be FB (regardless
of the marginal tax rate on I˜`).
This also explains why evasion by high-wage individuals is not interesting or relevant for our
purposes. The MS allocation entails no distortion of the h-types to be corrected. Moreover,
their evasion cannot weaken the IC constraint (5); nor is it necessary to achieve it. Effectively,
a setting with evasion by high-wage individuals becomes equivalent to MS.6
4.2 Second best
We now turn to the case where FB allocations violate condition (8) so that they cannot be
implemented. These are the allocations that lie to the right of and below point c on the Pareto
frontier in Figure 1. Kuhn-Tucker conditions of problem P ′` then yield second-best solutions at
which condition (8) is binding and λ > 0. Of course, with the resource constraint always binding,
µ must also be positive. Lemma 1 proves that γ > 0 as well because the optimal policy continues
to imply I˜1 = 0, though this time as a corner solution.
Lemma 1 The Lagrange multiplier γ in Problem P ′` is positive.
Proof. To begin with, observe that I˜1 has to be set to minimize the utility of the mimicker
uh`
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
which is the only term in problem P ′` that it affects. Specifically, given our
assumptions (in particular that of no overreporting), we must minimize uh` over I˜` ∈ [0, I`].
Let MRS denote the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income.
Given the standard assumptions on u, uh` is concave with at an interior maximum where
MRSh`
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
= wh. Now, from the first-oder condition (4e), we have MRS
``(I`−T`,
I`/w`) = w`. With wh > w`, MRS
h`
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
> MRS`` (I` − T`, I`/w`). Moreover,
from single-crossing property MRSh` (I` − T`, I`/wh) < MRS`` (I` − T`, I`/w`). These two in-
equalities imply
MRSh`
(
I˜` − T`, I˜`/wh
)
> MRSh` (I` − T`, I`/wh) (9)
It follows from inequality (9) and the concavity of uh` that I˜` > I`. Consequently, u
h` is
increasing over [0, I`] which in turn implies that it is minimized at I˜` = 0. This also implies that
the bracketed expression in equation (4d) is positive resulting in a positive solution for γ.
6The story would be different, of course, if one was concerned with an upward-binding IC constraint.
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Set I˜` = 0 in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4a)(4g) to simplify equations (4b), (4e)(4f) into
uc
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
+
1
wh
uL
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
= 0,
u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
− u (−T`, 0) = 0,
uc
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
+
1
w`
uL
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
= 0.
These equations, along with the resource constraint n`T` + nhTh = 0, determine a unique set of
values for Ih, Th, I`, T`. In particular, these values are independent of the weights assigned to u
h
and u`. Moreover, these equations are precisely the same equations that determine the first-best
allocation [(T ∗h , I
∗
h), (T
∗
` , I
∗
` )] at point c in Figure 1. Recall that c is the boundary point on the
Pareto frontier satisfying the IC constraint as an equality (beyond it the IC constraint will be
binding).
That increasing α` above its value at point c does not change the values of [(T
∗c
` , I
∗c
` ),
(T ∗ch , I
∗c
h )] is interesting, if at first surprising. However, one has to bear in mind that IC
constraints limit the extent of redistribution in second-best environments by making the bundle
intended for the `-types less appealing to the h-types; that is, by reducing uh`. Often, there is
a floor to how much uh` can be pushed down. In the MS setting, what usually limits the extent
of redistribution as α` → 1, is when I` hits zero. In the EL setting, uh` depends on I˜` and not
I`. The floor to redistribution is thus dictated by I˜` = 0 with I˜` ≤ I`. When redistribution is
limited by a positive value of I`, it will no longer be possible to make the `-types any better-off
by decreasing I` notwithstanding the fact that higher values of α` call for it. The numerical
example of Section 5 below illustrates this point.
Given that EL does not allow for redistribution beyond point c, one may wonder if the utility
of the l-types can be pushed beyond this point under MS. The answer is no. Take any MS
solution [(TMS` , I
MS
` ), (T
MS
h , I
MS
h )]; then set Th = T
MS
h , Ih = I
MS
h , T` = T
MS
` and I˜` = I
MS
`
under EL. This leaves the h-type's utility and the incentive and resource constraints unaffected.
This allows the `-type individuals to choose a level of income that differs from their reported level
thus increasing their utility over its level under MS. The suggested reallocation is not necessarily
the best policy. Which means the optimal policy can only do better.
The EL policy can in fact increase the utility of the `-types beyond what is feasible under
MS. There, one can never make the l-types more well-off than the h-types.7 In contrast, point c
7To see this, observe that with wh > w`, and the fact that utility changes negatively with labor supply, we
have
u
(
I` − T`, I`
wh
)
> u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
.
The IC constraint is
u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
≥ u
(
I` − T`, I`
wh
)
.
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is necessarily below the 45 degree line. At point c, where the incentive constraint starts to bind,
we have
uh = u
(
I∗h − T ∗h ,
I∗h
wh
)
= u (−T ∗` , 0) < u`.
The inequality follows because I` = 0 makes the consumption bundle (−T ∗` , 0) available to the
l-types. The inequality is strict as long as I∗` > 0. Compared to the competitive equilibrium, the
ranking of utilities is reversed. This property also implies that EL can implement the Rawlsian
FB solution (where the 45 degree line intersects the Pareto frontier). It follows that the solutions
that cannot be implemented are rather extreme and go beyond the usual notion of income
redistribution in the sense that inequalities are reversed.
Finally, observe that auditing can only increase the utility of the mimicker. Consequently,
the optimal policy involves no audits. The results derived so far are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 In the second best:
(i) The solution under EL, [(T ∗ch , I
∗c
h ), (T
∗c
` , I
∗c
` )], is unique. It is represented by point c in
Figure 1 regardless of h- and `-types' weights in the social welfare function.
(ii) Point c must be below and to the right of where the 45 degree line intersects the Pareto
frontier so that u` > uh.
(iii) The MS frontier must lie everywhere to the left of point c in Figure 1.
5 A numerical example
This section illustrates our results through a numerical example. Details of the derivations are
presented in the Appendix. Assume preferences are represented by the following quasilinear
utility function:
u = 2 [c+ β ln(1− L)]0.5 , (10)
where 0 < β < w`. The two ability-types are of equal size with the population size being
normalized at one. Hence n` = nh = 1/2. Additionally, set the parameter values to β = 10,
w` = 14 and wh = 20. Given these values, the Pareto frontier is represented by u
2
h + u
2
` = 14.82
as depicted in Figure 2. The two types utility levels then range from 0 to 3.85.
The laissez-faire allocation is found to be I` = c` = 4 and Ih = ch = 10 with the corresponding
utility levels of u` = 1.59 and uh = 3.50. This is the FB allocation if α` = 1/3 and is shown by
It follows from these two inequalities that
u
(
Ih − Th, Ih
wh
)
≥ u
(
I` − T`, I`
wh
)
> u
(
I` − T`, I`
w`
)
.
In this regard, Figure 2.1 in Stiglitz (1987, p. 2.1) which shows the FB and SB frontiers is misleading.
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Figure 2: Pareto frontier and implementable allocations under MS and EL. Utilities have the
functional form u = 2(c+ β ln(1− L))0.5, with wh = 20, w` = 14, and β = 10.
point a on the Pareto frontier in Figure 2. Redistribution towards the `-types from a becomes
desirable when α` exceeds 1/3. This limits the considered FB allocations to segment af on the
Pareto frontier. Segment ea on the PF represents the FB allocations that entail redistribution
to the h-types and are desired when α` < 1/3.
Under MS, the IC constraint (5) is satisfied as a strict inequality if and only if α` < 0.42.
Under EL, the IC constraint (8) holds as a strict inequality if and only if α` < 0.54. Consequently,
for all α` ∈ [1/3, 0.42], the first-best is implementable under both MS and EL settings. These
allocations correspond to the points on ab segment of the Pareto frontier. When α` exceeds
0.42, the first-best allocations can no longer be implemented under MS. However, as long as
α` ∈ [0.42, 0.54], the first-best is implementable under EL. These allocations are shown in Figure
2 as segment bc on the PF. When α` exceeds 0.54, the EL setting too cannot implement the
corresponding FB allocations. These are shown by segment cf on the PF in Figure 2.
Turning to allocations that are second-best, they will be attained under MS for α` > 0.42 and
shown in Figure 2 by the bb′ curve that lies everywhere below the PF. It approaches the 45 degree
line as α` → 1. The limiting `-types' allocation is I` = 0, c` = −T` = 1.53 resulting in u` = 2.48.
The corresponding values for the h-types are Ih = 10, ch = 8.48, and uh = 2.47731. Under EL, on
the other hand, there is no second-best allocation that extends beyond the boundary point c 
however high one raises α` above 0.54. This is the case because at α` = 0.54, I˜` = 0. Interestingly
though, whereas u` = 2.4773 for α` = 1 under MS, u` = 2.95 > 2.4773 for α` ≥ 0.54.
Table 1 illustrates the laissez-faire allocations as well as the first best, MS, and EL allocations
for different welfare weights. When low-productivity individuals have a welfare weight equal to
α` = 0.35 < 0.42, the first best is implementable under both MS and EL. When α` = 0.5 > 0.42,
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α` = 0.35 α` = 0.50 α` = 0.54 α` = 0.65
FB
I` = 4, Ih = 10
T = −2.24
I` = 4, Ih = 10 I` = 4, Ih = 10 u` = 3.39, uh = 1.82
EL
I` = 4, Ih = 10 T = −1.22 T = −1.53 I` = 4, Ih = 10
T = −0.20 u` = 2.72, uh = 2.72 u` = 2.95, uh = 2.48 T = −1.53
u` = 1.82, uh = 3.39 u` = 2.95, uh = 2.48
MS
I` = 3.52, Ih = 10 I` = 3.27, Ih = 10 I` = 2.67, Ih = 10
T = −0.74 T = −0.80 T = −0.92
u` = 2.34, uh = 3.05 u` = 2.37, uh = 3.02 u` = 2.42, uh = 2.93
LF I` = 4, Ih = 10, u` = 1.59, uh = 3.50
Table 1: Incomes, taxes, and utility levels in first-best, EL, MS, and laissez-faire allocations.
Utilities have the functional form u = 2(c+ γ ln(1− L))0.5, with w` = 14, wh = 20, and γ = 10.
the first-best allocation continues to be implementable under EL but not MS. This is the Rawlsian
FB solution with u` = uh = 2.72. The second-best MS solution for α` = 0.5 entails a lower utility
level for the `-types as compared to what they can attain under EL (2.34 versus 2.72). But the
h-types enjoy a higher utility level (3.05 versus 2.72.) At α` = 0.54, the EL solution remains
first-best with u` = 2.95 and uh = 2.48. This corresponds to point c on PF and caps the utility
level the `-types can attain under EL. Observe also that u` > uh at this point.
Raising α` further does not change the optimal allocations under ELnot even as a second-
best solution. Table 1 illustrates this point by finding the solution for α` = 0.65 for which we
continue to have u` = 2.95 and uh = 2.48 under EL. However, while we have the same allocation
for α` = 0.65 as for α` = 0.54, this allocation is not FB for α` = 0.65. At the FB allocation for
this value of α`, the `-types attain a higher utility level equal to u` = 3.39 (and the h-types a
lower utility level equal to uh = 1.82). The second-best MS allocation at α` = 0.65 results in
u` = 2.42 (and uh = 2.93) which is worse for the `-types as compared to EL.
6 Concluding remarks
Three decades ago Slemrod (1990, p. 157) wrote ...in its current state, optimal tax theory is
incomplete as a guide to action concerning the questions that began this paper and for other
issues in tax policy. It is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms with taxation as a
system of coercively collecting revenues from individuals who will tend to resist. Clearly, there is
still a long way ahead of us in this regard. In this paper, we have tried to take a short step in this
direction by assuming that one's willingness to misreport his income depends on his productivity
type. Interestingly, and rather surprisingly, we have found that all available allocations with
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truthful reporting of incomes have a corresponding weakly Pareto-superior allocation in a setting
where low-productivity types misreport their income but high-productivity do not. Moreover,
auditing is never desirable even if it can be done at no cost.
Specifically, we have shown that (i) every FB allocation that can be implemented under MS
can also be implemented under EL; (ii) every utility level that low-wage individuals can have
under a second-best MS solution is available to them as a first-best EL solution; (iii) the first-best
EL solutions include the Rawlsian outcome as well as outcomes wherein low-wages individuals
are better off than high-wage individuals (neither of these type of solutions are available under
MS).
There are many directions in which this work can be extended to integrate tax evasion into the
Mirrleesian optimal income tax framework. The first obvious direction is to relax the assumption
of perfect correlation between ability type and unwillingness to misreport income. Either one of
the two individual types, or both, may include honest and dishonest income reporters. One can
introduce a psychic evasion cost into the model which can be different for the types. Another
avenue is to explore the implications of introducing some kind of conditional honesty along the
lines of Alger and Renault (2006). The message of Slemrod (1990) remains as relevant today as
it was three decades ago.
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Appendix
A Details of derivations for the example
In the laissez-faire, with ci = wiLi, each individual maximizes
2 [wiLi + β ln(1− Li)]0.5 ,
with respect to Li. The first-order condition reduces to wi−β/(1−Li) = 0. Assuming wi−β > 0
for i = h, `, this yields interior solutions:
LLFi = (wi − β)/wi,
cLFi = wi − β.
uLFi = 2 [wi − β + β (lnβ − lnwi)]0.5
First-best solution The Lagrangian expression for the maximization of αhuh + α`u` subject
to the resource constraint is
£ = 2αh [ch + β ln(1− Lh)]0.5 + 2α` [c` + β ln(1− L`)]0.5 + µ (whLh + w`L` − ch − c`)
The first-order conditions for this problem are, for i = 1, 2,
∂£
∂ci
= αi [ci + β ln(1− Li)]−0.5 − µ = 0, (A1)
∂£
∂Li
= −αi β
1− Li [ci + β ln(1− Li)]
−0.5 + µwi = 0. (A2)
Substitute for µ from (A1) into (A2) and solve for Li to get
L∗i = (wi − β)/wi, i = h, `. (A3)
We also have, from (A1),
(αh)
2 [c` + β ln(1− L`)] = (α`)2 [ch + β ln(1− Lh)] . (A4)
Solving equations (A3)(A4) and the resource constraint for ch, c`, and T` yields
T ∗` =
α2h [w` − β + β ln (β/w`)]− α2` [wh − β + β ln (β/wh)]
α2` + α
2
h
,
c∗h = wh − β + T ∗` ,
c∗` = w` − β − T ∗` .
Given the specification for the utility function (10), and using the first-best values of ch, c`, Lh,
and L` from above equations, we have
u2h + u
2
` = 4 [wh + w` − 2β + β ln(β/wh) + β ln(β/w`)]
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The Pareto frontier is found from this equation to be
u` = 2
{
wh + w` − 2β + β [ln(β/wh) + ln(β/w`)]− u
2
h
4
}.5
Using the above values for c∗h, L
∗
h, c
∗
` , L
∗
` in the utility function (10), we have:
u
(
c∗h,
I∗h
wh
)
= 2αh
{
(wh + w` − 2β) + β [ln (β/w`) + ln(β/wh)]
α2` + α
2
h
}.5
, (A5)
u
(
c∗` ,
I∗`
wh
)
= 2
{
β ln
wh − w` + β
wh
+
α2` [wh + w` − 2β + β ln (β/wh)]− βα2h ln (β/w`)
α2` + α
2
h
}0.5
,
(A6)
u (−T ∗` , 0) = 2
{
α2` [wh − β + β ln (β/wh)]− α2h [w` − β + β ln (β/w`)]
α2h + α
2
`
}0.5
. (A7)
Comparing (A6) with (A7), one finds that u (−T ∗` , 0) < u
(
c∗` ,
I∗`
wh
)
if and only if
w` − β + β ln
(
1− w` − β
wh
)
> 0, (A8)
which is true for all wh > w` > β > 0 (as required for I
∗
` > 0).
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Second best under MS Under MS, the first-best allocation is implementable as long as (A8)
is satisfied. If this is not the case, the problem of the social planner is
max
I`,Ih,T
2αh
[
Ih + T + β ln
(
1− Ih
wh
)]0.5
+ 2α`
[
I` − T + β ln
(
1− I`
w`
)]0.5
(A9)
s.t. Ih + T + β ln
(
1− Ih
wh
)
≥ I` − T + β ln
(
1− I`
wh
)
.
It is straightforward to show that the second-best allocation is characterized by no distortion at
the top, i.e., IMSh = wh − β. Using this condition, the incentive compatibility constraint can be
rewritten as
wh − β + T + β ln
(
β
wh
)
≥ I` − T + β ln
(
1− I`
wh
)
,
which, when binding, implies that
T =
I` + β − wh − β ln(β) + β ln(wh − I`)
2
.
Substituting this expression for T and IMSh = wh − β in (A9), the problem of the social planner
can be rewritten as
max
I`
2αh
[
wh − β + β ln(β)
2
− β ln (wh) + I` + β ln(wh − I`)
2
]0.5
+ 2α`
[
wh − β + β ln(β)
2
+
I` − β ln(wh − I`)
2
+ β ln
(
1− I`
w`
)]0.5
8With wh > w` and w` − β,
w` − β + β ln
(
1− w` − β
wh
)
> w` − β + β ln
(
β
w`
)
> 0.
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The first-order condition, for an interior solution, is[
1
2
+
β
2(wh − IMS` )
]
αh
uh
+
[
1
2
+
β
2(wh − IMS` )
+
β
w` − IMS`
]
α`
u`
= 0.
Second best under EL The second-best outcome occurs when I˜` = 0 and we have a unique
solutions with IELh and I
EL
` set at their first-best levels and T being determined from (4f) as
TEL = −I
∗
h + β ln(1− I∗h/wh)
2
= −wh − β + β ln(β/wh)
2
.
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